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I. Abstract
This thesis is a microeconomic study of labor unions and a business analysis of a 
professional sports industry. It will examine the effects of the salary cap in the National Hockey 
League. The 2004-05 NHL season was cancelled due to a lockout because the National Hockey 
League Players' Association and the team owners could not come to an agreement on salaries. 
As a result, the Players' Association and the owners came to an agreement that included the 
implementation of a salary cap and revenue sharing. The purpose of this thesis is to determine 
whether or not the implementation of the salary cap was beneficial for the National Hockey 
League industry and how the labor strike affected revenues. The examination of the 
performance of the league's teams and total revenues versus pay will compare and contrast a 
few years prior to the lockout to a few years after the lockout. The differences in this data will 
demonstrate the effect of the lockout on the performance of the teams and the revenues of 
the league.
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Introduction
In 2004 it became apparent that the National Hockey League was going to face 
problems in the upcoming months because the current Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) 
was going to expire. A dispute between team owners and players, who are represented by the 
National Hockey League Players' Association (NHLPA), began over salaries. The NHLPA is, "a 
labour union whose members are the players in the NHL and whose mandate is to represent 
their interests. Headquartered in Toronto, the NHLPA has a staff of approximately 35 
employees who work in such varied disciplines as labour law, marketing, product licensing, 
community relations, and communications" (NHLPA). The owners said that the players were 
asking for too much money in salaries and that the teams could not afford to pay the players' 
salaries because the league was not making enough in revenues. As a result the 2004-05 
season was locked out in an attempt develop a new CBA. A lockout is like a strike, with the 
employer stopping its employees from working, to put pressure on the labor union.
During the lockout, countless meetings between the owners and players took place in 
order to come to an agreement on what should be a part of the new CBA. The individual 
players did not represent themselves at the meetings, but were represented by the NHLPA. On 
September 16, 2005 the owners and NHLPA finally came to an agreement, after missing an 
entire season of play, and the new Collective Bargaining Agreement was established. It will be 
in effect until September 15, 2011. "This agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the 
benefit of the NHL, the Clubs, NHLPA, and all players, and their respective successors or 
assigns" (Collective Bargaining Agreement 2005,11). Part of the CBA also was that the players 
agreed not to have a strike, work-stoppage, or a lockout during the length of the agreement.
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Prior to the lockout of 2004-05 there were not many rules in place restricting salary. 
The main points of the 2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement focused on salaries. The CBA 
introduced a salary cap, salary minimum, and revenue sharing. Don Campbell, the president of 
the Tampa Bay Lightning said, "Getting rich is not the goal [of the CBA]. Every one of these 
owners really wants a chance to win" (Brinkman, 2006,11). With the salary cap and revenue 
sharing, the goal is to develop parity in the league and give each team an equal chance to 
succeed. 1
The salary cap is a maximum salary that a team's total player salaries cannot exceed. 
Along with the cap, there is also a salary floor which a team's total player salaries cannot drop 
below. All of the salaries are paid in United States dollars even though six teams operate in 
Canada. Salary caps were $39 million in 2005-06 (CBA 2005, 217), $44 million in 2006-07, and 
$50.3 million in 2007-08. The minimum in 2005-06 was $21.5 million (CBA 2005, 217). The 
salary minimum is approximately $16 million less than the maximum or 55% of the maximum. 
The cap is adjusted each year because the players are guaranteed a certain percentage of 
hockey-related revenues. In 2005-06 it was projected there would be $1.8 billion in revenue 
and the players got 54% of that. As revenues rise the players' share can rise. Examples 
presented in the Collective Bargaining Agreement of 2005 are, when revenues are $2.2 billion 
they get 55%, $2.4 billion they get 56% and 57% at $2.7 billion. When an individual team is
l Some may wonder why a professional sport was chosen to examine a labor union, but there is a legitimate reason for this. 
Labor strikes and lockouts occur in various types of businesses but it is difficult to determine specific variables that are affected 
by the work stoppage. "Sports provide the ultimate avenue for examining business and management practices: owing to data 
availability, on the one hand, and the high degree of competition in the industry, on the other, sports can serve as a laboratory 
enabling the examination of propositions that might take decades or longer in other sectors of the economy" (Frick et. al., 
2003, 472)
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found to be hiding revenue that team is fined $1 million plus the amount the team failed to 
report for the first offense. For more offenses the team is fined $5 million plus double the 
amount that the team failed to report (CBA 2005,193). To make sure there is an equal revenue 
split, part of the players' salaries will be put in escrow. At the end of the season when it is 
known what team revenues actually were, the part of the players' salaries that were put into 
escrow will be divided among the players and owners (CBA 2005, 140). Since some players had 
multiyear contracts before the cap, these contracts were decreased by 24% (CBA 2005, 283). 
The 24% decrease was agreed upon by the NHL and the NHLPA during the CBA negotiations.
All players on the team's active roster, injured reserve list, and players who have left the 
team on a contract buyout salary are counted against the salary cap. The players who sign a 
National Hockey League contract and then are assigned to the minors or junior hockey are not 
counted in the cap. If a player is injured and will miss at least ten games the team can have a 
replacement player whose salary does not exceed the injured player's salary. An individual 
player cannot have a salary that is more than 20% of the cap, and his salary stays the same for 
the life of the contract (CBA 2005, 218). If a player signs a multiyear contract the salary will be 
averaged out each year regardless if that is what he is actually being paid.
The minimum player salary is $450,000 which will continue to rise to $525,000 in 2011­
12, when the Collective Bargaining Agreement expires (CBA 2005, 49). After the 2005 CBA 
expires the NHL and NHLPA will have to meet again to develop a new CBA. When a player's age 
is between 18 and 21 the individual is required to sign an entry level contract of $850,000 per 
year for his first three NHL seasons (CBA 2005, 24). This helps teams who have young talented 
players beat the cap because the players can only make a maximum of $850,000 each. If a
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player who is 35 or older signs a multiyear contract his salary is counted against the cap each 
year even if he retires before the contract has expired (CBA 2005, 189). Players can still receive 
bonuses, which can exceed the cap by 7.5% that season, but the following season the team will 
be penalized and whatever funds were spent on bonuses will be deducted from the teams cap. 
Only players on entry level contracts, veteran players who have played 400 games or more who 
sign a one-year contract after returning from a long-term injury, and players who sign a one 
year contract after the age of 35 can be eligible to earn a bonus. No player is allowed to 
renegotiate his contract until it expires (CBA 2005, 217).
All of the rule changes presented above have an impact on team's total salaries. With 
having the changes, each team will have to adapt the team's salary strategy and be forced to 
pay the players what they are worth, not what they are demanding to be paid. This study will 
examine the effects that these rule changes have had on the hockey industry in an attempt to 
determine if the changes are accomplishing the results that were wanted by the NHL and 
NHLPA, a more balanced and fair game. Also, the lockout itself and the new rules may have 
impacted the revenues of each team, which will also be examined.
III. Literature Review
Various studies have been conducted to explain performance and revenues in 
professional sports. Some of these studies were conducted before the National Hockey League 
lockout of the 2004-2005 season and some were after. The chart below summarizes the 
different variables that studies chose to use. Some focus on the individuals, whereas others 
focus on the team as a whole and the coaching staff.
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Players Coach Team
Age, weight, games played, Seasons coached in the NHL, career Revenues,
goals scored winning percentage attendance
(Lavoie and Grenier, 1987; Jones and Walsh, 1988; Sommers, 1988; McLean and Veall, 1992; 
Gomez, 1992; Idson and Kahane, 1995; Frick, Prinz, and Winkelmann, 2003; and Marchand,
Smeeding, and Torrey, 2006)
This section reviews previous studies and background information about pay versus 
performance and revenues.
J.C.H. Jones and William D. Walsh (1988), studied how salaries are affected by skills, 
structural elements of monopoly, monopsony, and discrimination. This has previously been 
done for other professional sports but few studies have focused on the National Hockey 
League. All of the data used in this study was from the 1977-78 NHL season. Jones and Walsh's 
study looked at independent variables of points per game, games played, penalty minutes, 
draft number, height, weight, and a dummy variable for whether or not the player had a French 
name. In their study these independent variables are used to explain the dependent variable, 
individual player's salaries. The variables change some depending on the position of the player, 
since for each position different characteristics are more relevant than others. The findings had 
an adjusted R-SQUARED, the goodness of fit of the model, of at least .65. Jones and Walsh had 
significant variables at the .1, .05, and .001 levels, but not every variable was statistically 
significant which is normal to find. In the study, Jones and Walsh found that skills appear to be 
the prime determinant of player salaries, which is shown in various other studies.
Robert C. McLean and Michael R. Veall (1992) expanded on the study by Jones and 
Walsh by using player data from the 1989-1990 seasons to determine discrimination: 
"Discrimination in labour markets can be salary discrimination or hiring (entry) discrimination.
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One place to study both types is professional sports, where there are publicly-available 
statistics which attempt to measure individual performance," (McLean and Walsh 1992, 470). 
McLean and Veall specifically studied the discrimination against Francophone Canadians in the 
NHL. Their data consisted of Anglophone Canadian, Francophone Canadian, American, and 
Europeans for every position in the game. The dependent variable used was life-time points 
per game for forwards and defensemen, and for goaltenders, lifetime goals against average.
The objective was to determine performance differentials connected to discrimination, for 
which the R-SQUARED was not very high, but higher in comparison to the study conducted by 
Lovoie, Grenier, and Voulombe (1978). Lovoie, Grenier, and Voulombe concluded that 
Francophone Canadians outperformed Anglophone Canadian players, which they interpreted as 
hiring discrimination. A comparison of McLean and Veall's study to Lovoie, Grenier, and 
Voulombe's shows similar results. In the 1992 study the coefficients for the Francophone 
Canadians and Anglophone Canadian players are smaller and not statistically significant when 
compared to the 1978 study, which shows that, as time passes, hiring discrimination against 
Francophone's has become less severe.
McLean and Veall's study also tested for salary discrimination based on where the 
player is from and what position he plays. Here the dependent variable was the natural log of 
salary; McLean and Veall used the same independent variables as before with the addition of 
career plus/minus statistics. Plus/minus statistics are the differences between goals scored and 
goals scored against, both while the player is on the ice. The results found, just as other studies 
have, that higher point production gets a higher salary and the older players generally get 
compensated for their years in the league.
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Another study, which was conducted by Todd L. Idson and Leo H. Kahne (1995), 
examines pay versus performance but included an aspect that the other studies do not -  
coworker productivity. Idson and Kahne found that, "team attributes have both direct effects 
on an individuals' pay, and indirect effects by altering the rates at which individual players' 
productive characteristics are valued." This study empirically assesses the effects of the 
productivity of teammates on the compensation of individuals on the team, so Idson and Kahne 
use independent variables for the individual player, coach, and team. The independent 
variables used were
Player Coach Team
Salary, games played, points per game, 
penalty minutes per game, height, weight, 
position, draft selection, dummy if the 
player was a free agent
Winning percentage, 
number of years coaching in 
the National Hockey League
Total
revenues
Idson and Kahne first regressed the player salaries on the players' own productivity and, after 
obtaining results, added in the team and coach variables. If the coefficients on their own 
productivity fall when the other variables are added, then the effect on the individual player's 
salary is determined by the productivity of the player's coworkers, coach and teammate. If the 
coefficients fall then the performance of the coaches and teammates affects the individual 
player's salary more than his own performance does. Idson and Kahne found that "players 
seem to be weakly gross substitutes in the production process in professional hockey and that 
labor inputs tend to be complementary factors" (Idson and Kahne, 1995). This means that the 
other players on the team and the coaching staff have a large effect on how an individual 
performs.
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Bernd Frick, Joachim Prinz, and Karina Winkelmann (2003) discuss pay inequalities and 
team performance in the National Basketball Association, National Football League, Major 
League Baseball, and National Hockey League. The studies discussed on the previous pages 
look at wage differentials over time and try to explain the wage gap's effect on performance, 
but few attempts have been made to analyze the influence of pay inequality on economic 
outcomes. Frick, Prinz, and Winkelmann compare their data with Gomez (2002) who found 
that "social capital is harmed in an organization that treats its labor inputs simply as a variable 
cost of production in need of minimization rather than a fixed cost of production." Gomez used 
data from five seasons, 1993-1998. Frick, Prinz, and Winkelmann's study used data from 
sixteen consecutive seasons beginning in 1988. Winning percentage is the dependent variable 
and independent variables are wage disparity, number of players on the roster, team dummies, 
and year dummies. The study found that in hockey a team is more successful as the pay 
distribution becomes more unequal over those sixteen seasons, "This implies that a single 'star- 
player' may be of paramount importance for the team's performance -  which, in turn will lead 
to a highly skewed distribution of player salaries without negatively affecting the performance 
of those at the lower end of the pay hierarchy" (Frick et. al., 2003).
Brinkman (2006) presents some of the effects of the 2005 Collective Bargaining 
Agreement of the salary cap and revenue sharing. As a result of the salary cap the star players 
are spread amongst the league and are not being paid as much as before the cap. This changes 
the results that Frick, Prinz, and Winkelmann found because teams cannot afford to pay their 
star player a huge salary and cannot afford to have multiple start players on their roster. The 
players will have to agree to take a salary cut.
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The study by P.M. Sommers (1998) of salary distribution and performance found that 
inequality has a negative impact on performance. He looked at the effect of salary inequality 
on NHL team performance by using different inequality measures and end-of-season team 
outcomes such as team points and the probability of a team making the playoffs. Joseph T. 
Marchand, Timothy M. Smeeding, and Barbara Boyle Torrey (2006) also studied this and used 
two approaches to measuring salary distribution and performance. The first way was the same 
that Sommers (1998) used and the second was focusing on the distribution of individual 
performance and of teamwork among linemen on a given team. Marchand, Smeeding, and 
Torrey found that inequality in the upper half of the salary distribution was more important to 
positive outcomes than was inequality in the lower half of the salary distribution.
As a result of the lockout, new rules were introduced by the 2005 Collective Bargaining 
Agreement which directly affected player salaries, the salary cap, and team revenues, revenue 
sharing. Taylor F. Brinkman (2006, 2) discusses revenue sharing, "In combination with a hard 
payroll cap, the plan [revenue sharing] promises to help restore parity in the league by 
redistributing a minimum of 4.5 percent of league revenues from the top ten revenue 
producing clubs to the bottom ten revenue producing clubs. Architects of the deal claim that 
the redistribution should allow low-revenue teams like Nashville and Carolina to be more 
financially competitive in free agency, which should presumably help them to be more 
competitive on the ice." Brinkman used data from the 1994-2004 seasons to study payroll 
versus points. The points are determined by wins and ties for the regular season games. For 
each of these seasons the regression output he obtained was not very good which he measured 
by the R-SQUARED value for each season, which demonstrates how much the independent
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variables explain the variation of the dependent variable. This means that since payroll does 
not fully explain how a team performs, there must be other variables which explain this. 
Brinkman says that this could be due to the fact that just because a team has the highest paid 
players, it does not mean that these players have good chemistry on the ice and will perform 
well together. Team owners have to make the decision either to focus on maximizing their 
revenues or to maximize the team's wins. The choice that owners make before the lockout 
may be different from after the lockout as a result of revenue sharing. The goals of the 2005 
Collective Bargaining Agreement are to increase the competitive balance of the league -  which 
for this paper is defined as the fans perceived probability that their team will reach the playoffs 
at the beginning of the season (Ross, 2002). Brinkman concluded that if "parity does not 
increase, it will likely be due to the payroll compression at the top of the league due to the 
salary cap, not additional spending by teams at the bottom due to revenue sharing" (Brinkman 
2006).
All of the studies have come to similar conclusions. The studies consistently found that 
skills appear to be the prime determination of player salaries, higher point production gets a 
higher salary, older players generally get compensated for their years in the league, and 
inequality in the upper half of the salary distribution is more important to positive outcomes 
than inequality was in the lower half of the salary distribution. These were all findings from 
before the 2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement, which introduced the salary cap and revenue 
sharing. Brinkman (2006) discusses how the newly introduced NHL salary cap and NHL revenue 
sharing could limit the findings that inequality in salaries is better for team performance,
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because now the goals of the league are to limit this and bring parity to the National Hockey 
League.
From all of the studies discussed above, the following theoretical model was developed 
taking into consideration all of the variables each of the previous studies used. This is to 
determine the effect of the lockout on the performance of the teams and the revenues of the 
league.
III. Theoretical Model
To compare the pre-lockout points and revenues to the post-lockout points and 
revenues two separate regressions are necessary. The first uses POINTS as the dependent 
variable and the second uses REVENUES as the dependent variable. Each has a different set of 
independent variables that will explain POINTS and REVENUES; however some variables are 
included in both regressions. The two regressions were utilized. Each consisted of one 
hundred eighty observations, which include three seasons before the lockout and three seasons 
after the lockout. In order to differentiate the impacts from pre-lockout to post-lockout, a 
slope dummy variable was used for each independent variable. Also, an intercept dummy was 
included in each regression to show the effects of pre-lockout times. These slope dummies 
measure the effects of each variable just using the three years before the lockout. When 
combining the slope dummies with each variable the effects of the pre-lockout are shown. For 
the post-lockout only each variable is considered because the intercept and slope dummies do 
not apply. These outputs are then compared to each other to show the effects of the 2004­
2005 National Hockey League Lockout and the 2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement which
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introduced the salary cap and revenue sharing. For this econometrics study, various data had 
to be collected or computed. The majority of the statistics and data were collected from 
NHL.com. The salaries were collected from the USA Today Salary Database.
Table 1: Explanation of Variables fo r the Points regression
POINTS: Points are the dependent variable. POINTS is 
measured by a combination of wins (2 points), ties (1 
point), overtime losses (1 point), and shootout losses 
(1 point)
ATTENDANCE: The teams' total attendance for all 41 home games 
during the regular season. It does not include playoff 
games.
AVGAGE: The teams' average age of all of the players that were 
on the roster in the season.
AVGAGESQ: The team's average age squared of all of the players 
that were on the roster in the season.
PENALTYKILL: The percentage of times when the team was on the 
penalty kill and it did not give up a goal.
POWERPLAY: The percentage of times when the team was on the 
power play and scored a goal.
RELSALRY: The relative salary for each team. This is found by first 
finding the league average salary by dividing the total 
league salary by the number of teams in the league, 
30. Then by dividing the individual team salary by the 
league average salary.
SHOTS: The average number of shots a team took during the 
82 regular season games.
SHOTSAGAINST: The average number of shots a team gave up during 
the 82 regular season games.
STANLEYCUP: The number of Stanley Cups, league championship, 
which the team has won in the season the data is from
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and the previous 4 seasons.
TOPPAID: The number of the twenty-five top paid players in the 
league that the team has on the teams' rosters.
LNYEARS: The natural log of the number of years that the team 
has been in the city they currently play in
PRECAP: The intercept dummy variable that is used to 
determine whether the data is from the three years 
before the 2004-05 NHL Lockout.
PC ATT, PCAVGAGE,
PCAVGAGESQ,
PCPENALTYKILL,
PCPOWERPLAY,
PCRELSALARY,
PCSHOTS,
PCSHOTSAGAINST,
PCSTANLEYCUP,
PCTOPPAID,
PCLNYEARS:
These are the slope dummies that are used to 
demonstrate the effects of each independent variable 
on the dependent variable. It is found by multiplying 
the PRECAP intercept dummy by each of the 
independent variables. For example: PCATT = 
PRECAP*ATTENDANCE
In the first regression POINTS is the dependent variable. It is used to measure how well 
a team performs during the season. A dilemma presented itself on whether or not to use 
POINTS or winning percentage. After review of previous studies, it was decided to use points. 
Brinkman states, "Professional ice hockey is peculiar among team sports in that the teams are 
not ranked simply based on winning percentage. Rather, teams are ranked based on a point 
system that awards two points to the winner of a contest, and one point to each team if the 
contest ends in a tie. Since ties affect teams' relative on-ice success, but are not reflected in 
teams' winning percentage, we chose to use points, not winning percentage, as the dependent 
or outcome variable" (2006, 5). This study selected the following independent variables 
because after research they were determined to be the best factors that influence points.
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ATTENDANCE is used as an independent variable due to its effect on team performance. 
It demonstrates the number of buyers that are attending games. If there are more people in 
attendance cheering the team on, the team most likely will attempt to perform better. This is a 
reason that teams really enjoy playing games at home because a lot of fans are in the stands 
wanting them to win. This creates a positive energy in the stadium and makes the game more 
enjoyable for the fans and players. This variable is expected to have a positive effect on points 
because the more people attending a game the better a team will perform.
AVGAGE is chosen because knowledge and experience can affect team performance. 
Teams that have a higher average age tend to perform better because their players have been 
in the league longer and they know things about the game that younger players might not 
know. This variable is expected to have a positive relationship with points because the higher 
the teams age is the better the team will perform; however, this positive performance will 
begin to decline at some point. Because of this AVGAGESQ. is also used in the regression. This 
allows the model to represent diminishing marginal skills.
PENALTYKILL is another variable that was chosen. Players would rather not receive 
penalties; however this does occur quite often. As a result, the teams that are then on the 
penalty kill play with at least one less player than the other team. This puts the offending team 
at a disadvantage and consequently, increases the probability of more goals being scored by 
the opposition. This variable is expected to have a positive relationship with points. If a team 
does not allow the other team to score at this part in the game, then the team on the penalty 
kill is not giving up a goal at one of the easiest times of the game for the other team to score.
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This study uses POWERPLAY as an independent variable. Players enjoy playing on the 
power play because they have at least one more player on the ice than the other team as a 
result of a penalty. It is easier for them to score at this time, and if a team is scoring then they 
are one step closer to winning the game which is the players' objective. This variable is 
expected to have a positive relationship with points because if a team is scoring during the 
power play they are closer to earning points for that game.
RELSALARY reflects producer expectations for team performance. In this case the 
producers are the team owners. If the owners are paying their players high salaries they are 
doing this because they have performed well in the past and are also expected to perform well 
in the future. So these players should be having success with their teams. This variable is 
expected to have a positive effect on points because, if a team is paying their players more 
money, they should be performing better. These data came from the USA Today salary 
database. The USA Today Salaries contains seasonal listings of salaries for NHL players for each 
of the six seasons. "The advantage of this salary database is that it contains guidelines for 
reporting salaries, which are consistent across seasons. The data contain players who had 
played at least 30 games in a season or who appeared in fewer than 30 games due to injury" 
(Marchand et. al., 2006, 5)
SHOTS was chosen as an independent variable. The athletes want to win and in order to 
do so they take shots in order to score a goal. When a team is taking a lot of shots, the fans get 
excited and will be supportive. This variable is expected to have a positive effect on points 
because if a team is making more shots during a game they should be scoring more goals which 
will be producing more points.
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SHOTSAGAINST is selected because it could affect both the players and fans. One would 
think that the athletes would perform better if the number of shots that they gave up was 
fewer. The more shots a team gives up, the worse the team is playing. So the players want to 
give up as few shots as possible because they want to win. The fans' tastes and preferences are 
also to see fewer shots against the team because they want their teams to win and if they give 
up fewer shots, the fans will be more supportive. This variable is expected to have a negative 
effect on points because if a team is giving up a greater number of shots, the team is going to 
earn a fewer number of points.
STANLEYCUP is used because of producer expectations and changes in consumer 
expectations. Before the salary cap, once a team won a championship, the team's successful 
players often changed teams because those players then believe they are worth more money 
and seek a higher salary. However, after the salary cap, this does not occur as often because 
other teams cannot offer the higher salaries. Before the salary cap this variable is expected to 
have a negative effect on the points since the teams do not have enough money to retain the 
successful players. After the cap this variable is expected to have a positive effect on the points 
since the teams could retain their successful players without other teams offering them a larger 
salary.
TOPPAID is chosen because of producer expectations' impact on supply. If the 
producer, owner of the team, expects that a player will perform well and is worth a high salary 
that owner will try to get them on their team. The owner's expectations should create a 
greater supply of top paid players on the team. This variable is expected to have a positive
18
effect on points because the more top paid players a team has the better one would expect 
them to perform.
LNYEARS is used because knowledge and experience can impact demand. The more 
years a team has been located in a city, the more knowledge they will have with running a 
professional hockey team. This could benefit the team in terms of making revenue. Also, if 
they have been in a city longer, one would expect them to have an established fan base that 
continuously support the team. This is expected to have a positive effect on points. The 
natural log of years was used instead of years because it represents that the more years a team 
has been in a city the more they will make in revenues until a certain point and then it will level 
off.
PRECAP was included because it is an intercept dummy variable. It has a value of 1 if 
the observation is from 2001-02, 2002-03, or 2003-04 season. It has a value of 0 if the 
observation is from 2005-06, 2006-07, or 2007-08 season. If PRECAP is statistically significant, 
the coefficient of the variable will be added to the intercept coefficient when evaluating the 
results for the precap times.
The slope dummies are used to show the differences in each variable from precap times 
to postcap times. This is demonstrated by,
Yt = β0+ β 1X1t + β2D + β3DXt
If D=1 precap then the relationship will be 
Yt = (β  0+ β2) + (β1 + β3) Xt
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This graph will look like this if both the independent variable and slope dummy are both 
significant and positive. The precap will have a steeper slope than the post cap.
I will be evaluating each variable I have chosen and their related slope dummy variables 
to see if this type of relationship exists which will demonstrate the changes in each variable 
from precap times to postcap times.
Table 2: Explanation of Variables fo r the Revenues regression
REVENUES: Revenues are the dependent variable. It is measured in 
millions of dollars and the total revenues for each 
organization for a year.
ATTENDANCE: The teams' total attendance for all 41 home games 
during the regular season. It does not include playoff 
games.
AVGTICPRICE: The average ticket price for each team. It does not 
include the premium seating.
CANADIAN: A dummy variable for whether or not the team is 
Canadian.
PROSPORTS: The number of professional sports that are also played 
in the same city as the NHL team. They consist of the 
National Basketball League, National Football League, 
Canadian Football League, and Major League Baseball.
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TOPPAID: The number of the twenty-five top paid players in the 
league that the team has on their roster.
YEARS: The number of years that the team has been in the city 
they currently play in.
POINTS: The number of points the team accumulates during the 
82 game regular season. They receive 2 points for a win, 
1 point for a tie, overtime loss, or shootout loss.
GOALFOR: The total number of goals scored by the team in the 82 
game regular season.
PRECAP The intercept dummy variable that is used to determine 
whether the data is from the three years before the 
2004-05 NHL Lockout.
PCATT,
PCAVGTICPRICE,
PCCANADIAN,
PCPROSPORTS,
PCTOPPAID,
PCYEARS,
PCPOITNS,
PCGOALFOR:
These are the slope dummies that are used to 
demonstrate the effects of each independent variable 
on the dependent variable. It is found by multiplying 
the PRECAP intercept dummy by each of the 
independent variables.
For example: PCATT = PRECAP*ATTENDANCE
For this particular regression, REVENUES, is the dependent variable, which is measured 
in millions of dollars. The goal is to determine whether or not the revenue sharing that was 
implemented to the National Hockey League in 2005 had much affect on how much teams were 
making. By implementing revenue sharing, the clubs are forced to cooperate, evening out the 
distribution of talent for the good of the league. To make the game more exciting for fans, 
there must be parity in the league, and teams should have equal changes to be successful. The 
following independent variables were selected because after research they were determined to 
be the best factors that influence revenues. The NHL gets revenue from ticket sales, television 
contracts, and merchandise sales. All of this is based on the fan interest. It is believed that the
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demand for hockey is elastic because there is a small base of diehard fans but the majority of 
people that attend games are not diehard fans.
ATTENDANCE is used because it affects demand since it shows the number of buyers 
that a team has during the regular season. This variable is expected to have a positive effect on 
the dependent variable, revenues, because as the attendance at the games increases the 
revenues that will be made will increase.
AVGTICPRICE is selected because of producer expectations and consumer expectations 
influence on supply and demand. The owners will set ticket prices based on charging a certain 
amount and still making revenues. They want to set this price above where their marginal costs 
will equal the average total costs so that they are making profits. Hockey teams are able to 
increase their ticket prices because their customers have the highest average household 
income, $88,000 in sports (Ozanian, Badenhausen, 2008). Because of hockey fans income, 
changes in ticket prices do not deter many of the fans from attending games. The consumers' 
expectations will influence whether or not they actually want to purchase the tickets at these 
prices that are set. This variable is expected to have a positive relationship with revenues 
because as the average ticket price increases, as long as they are still selling tickets, the 
revenues will increase.
CANADIAN was decided on because it demonstrates tastes and preferences which is a 
determinant of demand. Hockey is an extremely popular sport in Canada so one would expect 
that the Canadian people will spend more money supporting their national support. Thus, this 
variable should have a positive effect on revenues.
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PROSPORTS is used because it shows both substitutes and complements which affect 
demand. The other professional sports in the city can be a substitute for the National Hockey 
League fans, but can also be a complement. A lot of fans support a city, not just a particular 
team and will buy merchandise and attend games in each sport. Also, a lot of cities' sports 
teams will work together for support of the teams and provide promotions for various teams in 
the city. Some promotions allow fans to take their ticket stub from one sports game to the 
ticket booth where they can purchase a ticket to another sport for a discounted price. During 
the lockout, there were no NHL games to attend, so the hockey fans turned to the other sports 
in the city as a substitute. This could have affected NHL teams because people may have 
realized that they enjoy the other sports more. Also during the lockout a lot of teams gave 
discounted tickets to other sports in the cities to their season ticket holders and frequent ticket 
buyers to keep them interested. This could have hurt the fan base for the NHL and after the 
lockout the people who used to support the NHL teams have turned to other professional 
sports. This variable is expected to have a positive effect on the revenues, however it is 
expected that before the cap it will have a larger impact.
TOPPAID is selected because it demonstrates the changes in expectations of the 
consumers which will affect the demand. If a team has more of the higher paid players in the 
league their revenues could increase because the fans will expect the team to perform better 
and want to support teams that perform well. A number of these top paid players have a fan 
base just for them, so these fans will attend the games just to watch that particular player and 
purchase merchandise to support that player. This variable will have a positive effect on the 
revenues.
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YEARS is chosen because of consumer expectations impacts on demand. If a team has 
been in a city for awhile they have established a fan base and these fans expect certain things. 
They will have more knowledge of the team since they have been around longer. This variable 
is expected to have a positive effect on revenues because the more years a team has been in a 
city the greater fan base they will have to support their team an increase revenues.
POINTS is used because of changes in consumer expectations. If a team is performing 
well then people will be more willing to support that team. This occurs a lot later in the season 
when certain teams are not performing very well so they join other teams that are performing 
better. As consumers expectations change, how they support their teams will change. This 
variable is expected to have a positive effect on revenues because as a team performs better 
more people will support the team monetarily.
GOALFOR is utilized because it demonstrates how tastes and preferences and changes in 
expectations can affect demand. The expectations of the fans of how many goals a team will 
score will affect the revenues because they will determine if they want to support the team for 
a particular game based on how many goals they think the team will score against different 
opponents. The number of goals scored also applies to peoples tastes and preferences because 
some people want to see an exciting game with a lot of scoring while other want to see a game 
with excellent defense and goaltending with a low scoring game. This variable is hypothesized 
to have a negative effect on revenues. Because of the fans tastes and preferences the variable 
of goals scored separates the hockey fans from the individuals that go to the games for purely 
entertainment purposes. After asking various hockey fans, they said they enjoy games that are 
low scoring with great goaltending. They find that to be more exciting because they
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understand the game. People who are there just for entertainment purposes want to see a lot
of goals because they feel that is the exciting part of the game. The number of fans should 
outnumber the number of people who are there for entertainment purposes which is why this 
variable is negatively related to revenues.
The intercept dummy, PRECAP, and all of the slope dummies are used once again for the 
same reasons they were used in the regression where POINTS was the dependent variable.
IV. Presentation and Analysis of Data 
Estimated Equations:
PRECAP REVENUES = (β 0 + β 17) PRECAP + (β 1  +  β 2) ATTENDANCE + (β 3 + β 4) 
AVGTICPRICE + (β 5 + β 6) CANADIAN + (β 7+ β8) GOALFOR + (β 9+ β 10) POINTS + (β 1 1 
+ β 12) PROSPORTS + (β13 + β 1 2) TOPPAID + (β 15+ β 16) YEARS
POSTCAP REVENUES = β 0 + β 1 ATTENDANCE + β 3 AVGTICPRICE + β 5 CANADIAN + 
β 7 GOALFOR + β 9 POINTS + β 1 1 PROSPORTS + β 13 TOPPAID + β 15 YEARS
PRECAP POINTS =  (β 0 +  β 23) PRECAP +  ( β 1  +  β 2) ATTENDANCE +  (β 3 +  β 4) AVGAGE 
+ (β 5 + β 6) AVGAGESQ + (β 7 + β 8) PENALTYKILL + (β 9 + β 10) POWERPLAY + (β 1 1  + 
β 12) RELSALARY + (β 13 +  β 14) TOPPAID+ (β 15 + β 6) LNYEARS+ (β 17+  β 18 ) 
STANLEYCUP+ (β19 + β 20) SHOTS + (β 2 1 +  P 22) SHOTSAGAINST
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POSTCAP POINTS = (β0 + β1 ATTENDANCE + β3 AVGAGE + β5 AVGAGESQ + β7 
PENALTYKILL + β9 POWERPLAY + β11 RELSALARY+ β13 TOPPAID + β15 LNYEARS + 
β17 STANLEYCUP+ β19 SHOTS+ β21 SHOTSAGAINST
a. Presentation and Analysis of Data - Revenues
Dependent Variable: REVENUES 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 02/04/10 Time: 12:19 
Sample: 1 180 
Included observations: 180
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 15.65633 20.37995 0.768222 0.4435
ATTENDANCE -7.79E-05 2.72E-05 -2.861744 0.0048
PCATT 0.000165 3.64E-05 4.530891 0.0000
AVGTICPRICE -0.387480 0.208882 -1.855019 0.0654
PCAVGTICPRICE 0.751739 0.315918 2.379536 0.0185
CANADIAN 14.58938 5.608973 2.601078 0.0102
PCCANADIAN -20.32354 7.826341 -2.596812 0.0103
GOALFOR -3.526132 2.318733 -1.520715 0.1303
PCGOALFOR 3.490605 2.320808 1.504047 0.1345
POINTS 0.934279 0.139930 6.676780 0.0000
PCPOINTS -0.721331 0.212664 -3.391882 0.0009
PROSPORTS 0.039291 0.083457 0.470799 0.6384
PCPROSPORTS 3.451816 1.570279 2.198218 0.0294
TOPPAID -0.066862 0.148944 -0.448903 0.6541
PCTOPPAID 2.553069 1.835083 1.391255 0.1661
YEARS 6.528476 1.572959 4.150444 0.0001
PCYEARS -6.319773 1.575015 -4.012517 0.0001
PRECAP -44.64152 28.54575 -1.563859 0.1198
R-squared 0.754674 Mean dependent var 53.97778
Adjusted R-squared 0.728930 S.D. dependent var 28.57920
S.E. of regression 14.87959 Akaike info criterion 8.332497
Sum squared resid 35867.14 Schwarz criterion 8.651793
Log likelihood -731.9247 F-statistic 29.31445
Durbin-Watson stat 2.122721 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
By evaluating the regression output where total team revenues are the dependent
variable the overall goodness of fit, R-SQUARED, is fairly good. The adjusted R-SQUARED is
.728930. The significant variables are ATTENDANCE, PCATT, AVGTICPRICE, PCAVGTICPRICE, 
CANADIAN, PCCANADIAN, POINTS, PCPOINTS, PCPROSPORTS, YEARS, and PCYEARS. The
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variable of ATTENDANCE is only statistically significant before the lockout, because after the
lockout the sign is not as hypothesized. From this regression output two separate equations 
can be formed, one for precap revenues, and the other for postcap revenues.
PRECAP Revenues:
Revenues = 15.66C + .00086Attendance + .365AvgTicPrice -  5.73Canadian +
.214Points + 3.45ProSports + .209Years
POSTCAP Revenues:
Revenues = 15.66C - .387AvgTicPrice + 14.589Canadian + .934Points + 6.53Years 
The values of the coefficients for the precap revenues are found by combining the 
coefficients of the independent variable and the related slope dummy variable. The attendance 
coefficient was found by combining -.0000779 and .000165, which results in .00086. This was 
done for every statistically significant variable where the slope dummy was also statistically 
significant. These variables are ATTENDANCE, AVGTICPRICE, CANADIAN, POINTS, and YEARS. 
The variable of PROSPORTS was not significant, but the slope dummy, PCPROSSPORTS was, so 
the coefficient value of 3.45 was included in the precap equation. Also notice that the intercept 
is 15.66 for both the precap and postcap equations. This is due to the fact that the PRECAP 
intercept dummy variable was not statistically significant.
The values of the coefficients for the postcap revenues are found directly from the 
regression output. Each independent variable that was statistically significant is included in the 
equation. These variables were AVGTICPRICE, CANADIAN, POINTS, and YEARS. The PROSPORTS 
variable is not statistically significant in the postcap times. Once again, ATTENDANCE is not 
statistically significant because the sign is not as hypothesized.
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Each of the statistically significant variables has changed from precap to postcap times. 
The impacts that each will have on total team revenues will be different, which is shown by the 
corresponding coefficients. This can be evaluated by comparing the precap revenues to 
postcap revenues equation. Before the lockout for every fan that attended a game, revenues 
would increase by .00086 million dollars, other variables held constant. After the lockout, no 
results can be drawn from the ATTENDANCE variable since it was not statistically significant 
which could be because other variables are influencing revenues more after the lockout. . 
However; NHL arenas fill to 93% of capacity in 2007-08 season, so attendance is not a large 
problem (Ozanian et. al., 2008). For every dollar increase in average ticket prices before the 
lockout, revenues increased by $365,000. After the lockout for every dollar increase in average 
ticket prices, revenues decreased by $387,000. Before the lockout, if a team was located in 
Canada they were making 5.73 million dollars less than a team that was located in America. 
After the lockout, the Canadian teams were making 14.589 million dollars more than teams 
located in America. This could be because hockey is extremely popular in Canada, but Canadian 
fans were not supporting their teams much before the lockout, however; these fans could have 
missed having the NHL for an entire season and once the NHL came back they supported their 
teams a lot more. Before and after the lockout, the amount of points a team earns in a season 
had a positive effect on revenues. However, it became greater after the lockout. For every 
additional point a team earned before the cap, the team was making $214,000, and after the 
cap teams were making $934,000 for each increase in points, other variables held constant.
This could be directly related to the parity that was hoped to be created by the 2005 Collective 
Bargaining Agreement. If teams have a more equal chance of being successful the fans will
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want to support them more in hopes of their team being the best. Also, the teams who have 
more points are the more successful teams in the league so their fans will want to support a 
winning team. For every year a team has been in the league they will make $209,000 before 
the lockout and $653,000 after the lockout. This is because teams that have been in a city 
longer will have an established fan base that will support the team.
The PROSPORTS variable is only impacting revenues before the lockout, and has no 
impact after the lockout since the PROSPORTS variable is not statistically significant. Since 
PCPROSPORTS is statistically significant it makes a difference during precap times. For every 
addition professional sports team located in the city the revenues of the NHL team will increase 
by 3.45 million dollars. This is because a lot of teams in the city will work together for fans and 
revenues. The teams will advertise and promote together, so there is more advertising if there 
are more teams in a city. Also, a lot of fans are fans of all of the teams in the same city, so they 
act as complements for one another. During the lockout a lot of promotions were offered by 
hockey teams to support the other professional teams in the city. This included discounted 
tickets to season-ticket holders and long time supporters of the NHL teams so they would still 
have entertainment from professional sports. Some of these people realized that going to a 
Major League Baseball, National Basketball Association, National Football League, or Canadian 
Football League games was better for them than attending NHL games. This may be a reason 
that PROSPORTS variable does not have an impact on revenues after the lockout.
Another interesting thing that these regressions show is the mean revenues before and 
after the lockout. This can be seen in the descriptive statistics which are located in the 
appendix, A-3 and A-4. Before the lockout the average revenues for a team was $71,210,000
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and after the lockout was $82,780,000. So after the lockout teams were better in terms of
revenue generated, which could be attribute to the revenue sharing policy that was developed 
in the 2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement.
Multicollinearity and serial correlation are some problems that can occur with this type 
of study, however; I did not find evidence of these problems existing.
b. Presentation and Analysis of Data -  Points
Dependent Variable: POINTS 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 02/15/10 Time: 12:20 
Sample: 1 180 
Included observations: 180
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 1717.179 745.1171 2.304576 0.0225
ATTENDANCE 1.04E-05 1.49E-05 0.701065 0.4843
PCATT 1.76E-05 2.14E-05 0.822137 0.4123
AVGAGE -134.6528 54.88134 -2.453525 0.0152
PCAVGAGE 140.9159 64.94411 2.169803 0.0315
AVGAGESQ 2.508735 1.015572 2.470269 0.0146
PCAVGAGESQ -2.603715 1.200241 -2.169327 0.0316
PENALTYKILL 1.632513 0.490234 3.330071 0.0011
PCPENALTYKILL 0.203746 0.769152 0.264897 0.7914
POWERPLAY 2.450081 0.508711 4.816256 0.0000
PCPOWERPLAY -0.567172 0.699029 -0.811372 0.4184
RELSALARY 15.50920 9.106384 1.703113 0.0905
PCRELSALARY -22.13897 12.65601 -1.749285 0.0822
TOPPAID 0.191413 1.755901 0.109011 0.9133
PCTOPPAID 1.488185 2.744101 0.542322 0.5884
LNYEARS -1.637048 1.521549 -1.075909 0.2836
PCLNYEARS 1.815320 2.251038 0.806437 0.4212
STANLEYCUP -0.273950 3.777011 -0.072531 0.9423
PCSTANLEYCUP -2.659381 4.917850 -0.540761 0.5894
SHOTS 0.309806 0.646952 0.478870 0.6327
PCSHOTS 1.527621 1.100561 1.388038 0.1671
SHOTSAGAINST -0.864719 0.575830 -1.501691 0.1352
PCSHOTSAGAINST -0.868465 0.801014 -1.084207 0.2799
PRECAP -1931.151 892.5224 -2.163700 0.0320
R-squared 0.596154 Mean dependent var 88.97778
Adjusted R-squared 0.536612 S.D. dependent var 14.94831
S.E. of regression 10.17570 Akaike info criterion 7.601448
Sum squared resid 16153.00 Schwarz criterion 8.027176
Log likelihood -660.1303 F-statistic 10.01242
Durbin-Watson stat 2.191444 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
30
By evaluating the regression output where points are the dependent variable the overall 
goodness of fit, R-SQUARED, is fairly good. The adjusted R-SQUARED is .536612. The significant 
variables are AVGAGE, PCAVGAGE, AVGAGESQ, PCAVGAGESQ, PENALTYKILL, PCPENALTYKILL, 
POWERPLAY, PCPOWERPLAY, RELSALARY, PCRELSALARY, and PRECAP. From this regression 
output two separate equations can be formed, one for precap points, and the other for postcap 
points.
PRECAP Points:
Points = -213.971C + 6.26AvgAge - .09AvgAgeSq -  6.63RelSalary
POSTCAP Points:
Points = 1717.179C -  134.65AvgAge + 2.15AvgAgeSq + 1.63PenaltyKill
+2.45PowerPlay + 15.51RelSalary
The values of the coefficients for the precap points are found by combining the 
coefficients of the independent variable and the related slope dummy variable. The RELSALARY 
coefficient was found by combining 15.51 and -22.14, which results in -6.63. This was done for 
every statistically significant variable where the slope dummy was also statistically significant. 
These variables are AVGAGE, AVGAGESQ, RELSALARY, and PRECAP. PRECAP is the intercept 
dummy, so it was combined with the coefficient of C, which changes the intercept from precap 
to postcap. The variables of PENALTYKILL and POWERPLAY were only statistically significant 
after the lockout, which is why both are only included in the postcap equation.
The values of the coefficients for the postcap revenues are found directly from the 
regression output. Each independent variable that was statistically significant is included in the
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equation. These variables were AVGAGE, AVGAGESQ, PENALTYKILL, POWERPLAY, and 
RELSALRY.
Each of the statistically significant variables has changed from precap to postcap times. 
The impacts that each will have on total team revenues will be different, which is shown by the 
corresponding coefficients. This can be evaluated by comparing the precap revenues to 
postcap revenues equation. Before the salary cap AVGAGE had a positive effect on POINTS, 
and after the salary cap it had a negative effect on POINTS. This means that he older a team is ’ 
before the lockout the better they performed to a certain point, but after the lockout if a team 
was older, they performed worse. Before the lockout for every million dollars in salary relative 
to the rest of the league that a team spent on salaries the total points earned by the team 
decreased by 6.63. After the lockout for every million dollars in salary relative to the rest of the 
league that a team spent on salaries the total points earned by the team increases by 15.51. So 
before the salary cap was introduced teams were paying their players more and performing 
worse. After the salary cap, owners had to carefully consider and evaluate how much to pay 
each player and the teams performed better since RELSALARY is positively related to points 
after the salary cap.
After the salary cap PENALTYKILL and POWERPLAY independent variables are 
statistically significant, and they were not before the cap. For every percentage better a team 
was on the PENALTYKILL the team received 1.63 more points in the standings. For every 
percentage better a team was on the POWEPLAY the team received 2.45 more points in the 
standings. This demonstrates that POWERPLAY and PENALTYKILL is more important to how
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well a team performs overall after the salary cap when the talent in the league is more spread
out.
All other variables that were included in the regression assume the coefficient of zero 
because they are not statistically significant. Therefore they have no effect on the results and 
there is no need for those variables to be discussed.
Multicollinearity and serial correlation are some problems that can occur with this type 
of study, however; I did not find evidence of these problems existing.
V. Conclusions and Policy Implications
This econometrics study analyzes two different aspects of a professional sport, 
performance as measured by POINTS and earnings measured by REVENUES. This study is 
different from many other previous studies that have been done because this analyzes the 
team as a whole whereas other studies analyze individual players. The goal of this study was to 
determine the independent variables that best explain performance and revenues and analyze 
how they changed due to a labor dispute.
The R-SQUARED of revenues was .75467. The R-SQUARED represents that 75.467% of 
the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the independent variables. The R- 
SQUARED of points was .59615. The R-SQUARED represents that 59.615% of the variation in 
the dependent variable is explained by the independent variables. Since all of these regressions 
do not have a R-SQUARED of 1.0 there are more variables that can be included or taken out; 
however, having a model that is perfect is extremely rare.
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After comparing the regression outputs for revenues as the dependent variable before 
and after the 2004-05 National Hockey League lockout, a few conclusions can be drawn. Before 
the lockout teams were making less money in revenues overall compared to after the lockout. 
This is demonstrating that fans enjoy the "New NHL" that was created by the 2005 Collective 
Bargaining Agreement and the revenue sharing is helping. The promotions and other 
professional sports in the same cities used to be more of a complement with each other, 
however; after not having the NHL season for a year other professional sports have become 
more of a substitute for professional hockey.
Fewer conclusions can be drawn from the regression output where points are the 
dependent variable. A lot of the variables were not significant, if they had been a lot of 
conclusions could have been shown. One conclusion that these results do show is that there 
are lagged effects. The changes in the competitive balance of the league are going to take 
more time than just the three years after the salary cap was introduced. If this study were 
done later with more years of data included, it may show that the goal of the 2005 Collective 
Bargaining Agreement to alter the competitive balance of the National Hockey League was met.
Another conclusion that was drawn from the POINTS regression was after the lockout 
when the salary cap was introduced team owners did not have the ability to pay players what 
they wanted, but had to pay them what they were worth based on past and expected 
performance. When teams could spend as much as they wanted they would try to get the best 
players in the league and end up having a price war with other owners who wanted the same 
players. This drastically raised the salaries of certain players. This resulted in certain teams 
having a couple of highly paid players and then a large number of low paid players on the
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roster. After the salary cap came into effect teams had to alter their rosters, releasing high paid 
players, and then acquires more average paid players. These players ended up playing better 
together and performing better as a whole. Hockey is a team sport and one player cannot 
control the outcome of the game on their own. Since hockey is a team sport every player on 
the game roster will play in the game with exception of the backup goalie.
If one evaluates the descriptive statistics in the appendix, A-1 and A-2, the mean 
number of points each team earned increased, so overall the teams are performing better. 
However, the increase in the mean could be because there is a winner in every game now. 
Before the lock-out games could end in a tie, resulting in each team earning one point in the 
standings. After the lock-out, every game ends with a winner and loser, the winner receiving 
two points. Also, the standard deviation decreased from 15.15 to 14.47, which could indicate 
that disparity in POINTS was reduced as a result of the salary cap.
The descriptive statistics for revenues, A-3 and A-4, are also very interesting. All 
descriptive statistics for REVENUES increased including of skewness, which could be because 
the maximum team revenue was so high and could be an outlier. The descriptive statistics for 
GOALFOR shows that one of the objectives of the Collective Bargaining Agreement was met, 
the increase in goals scored in a game. The mean, median, maximum, and minimum all 
increased greatly.
For each regression there are independent variables that can be controlled and some 
that cannot be controlled. For the variables that can be controlled, some are controlled by the 
team owners while others are controlled by the players. In the regression where POINTS is the
35
dependent variable, the only variable that cannot be controlled is LNYEARS. The variables that 
are controlled by the owners are ATTENDANCE, AVGAGE, AVGAGESQ, RELSALARY, and 
TOPPAID. They control these because they choose the players to be on the team and how 
much to pay them. The variables that are controlled by the players are POWERPLAY, 
PENALTYKILL, STANLEYCUP, SHOTS, and SHOTSAGAINST. They control these because they are 
determined by how well the players play. The variable of RELSALARY that the owners control 
has the most effect on POINTS in the post-lockout regression. The higher the team salary 
relative to the total league salary, the more points a team will earn in the standings. Before the 
lockout this variable was not even significant. Because of this, the owners who control 
RELSALRY should pay close attention to what players they choose for their team and how much 
to pay them because that impact how well the team performs in the standings. As stated 
earlier, owners want to win. The variable POWERPLAY that the players control has the most 
effect on POINTS in the post-lockout regression. As a result of this, the players should work 
even harder to score more goals while on the power play because this model demonstrates 
that it will increase their points in the standings more than any of the other variables they 
control.
In the regression where REVENUES is the dependent variable, the variables that cannot 
be controlled are PROSPORTS, CANADIAN, and YEARS. The variables that are controlled by the 
owners are ATTENDANCE, AVGTICPRICE, and TOPPAID. This is because the owners choose the 
players on the team and set their ticket prices which will affect the attendance at games. The 
players can control POINTS and GOALFOR because these are measured by their performance in 
games. The variable AVGTICPRICE which the owners control impact REVENUES the most. The
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variable POINTS is controlled by the players and has the most effect on revenues that they can 
control. Because of this, the players should try to gain as many points in the standings as 
possible to increase their team revenues. If they do this they could be paid more money in the 
long run since the salary cap is based on the total revenues of the league.
VII. What learned and What's Next
From all of the previous literature I was able to find on this topic, I never found anything 
like my study. No one proposed the question that I asked in the way that I did. There are a lot 
of studies about individual performance and pay, but I never found any that were done after 
the lockout when the salary cap was implemented. I was able to use all of the previous 
research to develop my model by seeing which variables they used to explain player 
performance. I found that the conclusions that these studies came to were not the same 
conclusions that my study showed. I found that older players are still generally compensated 
for their years but not by as much as they used to be due to the salary limits, but found that 
inequality in the upper half of the salary distribution was not more important to positive 
outcomes. This is because teams cannot afford to pay players huge salaries anymore so the 
salaries are more balanced on teams now instead of having large extreme differences.
With the salary cap and revenue sharing, the goal was to develop parity in the league 
and give each team an equal chance to succeed, which seems evident that this occurred based 
on my study. There are lagged effects with this study, and in the future with more years of data 
the benefits of the salary cap and revenue sharing can be shown empirically more.
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My study/model is not perfect and there is room for improvement. There are probably
some other variables that could be included that I did not think of. I tried other variables in 
previous models but ended up removing them because they did not make the model any better 
and caused problems with the variables being correlated. With including more variables that 
would make the model better would increase the R-SQUARED.
I would love to see other studies that assess the salary cap in the NHL econometrically 
so that I could compare my results to theirs since I did not find any type of study like mine. If I 
were to continue this and expand upon it I would love to do the study for other professional 
sports leagues that do not have a salary cap and be able to answer the question "does money 
buy championships"
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IX. Appendix
A-1 : These are descriptive statistics for the regression where POINTS is the dependent variable before the 2004-05 NHL Lockout
POINTS ATTENDANCE AVGAGE AVGAGESQ PENALTYKILL POWERPLAY RELSALARY TOPPAID LN YEARS STANLEYCUP SHOTS  SHOTSAGAINST
Mean 86.69 681956.60 26.84 721.95 83.79 16.18 1.00 0.83 3.17 0.17 28.01 28.05
Median 91.00 684981.00 26.64 709.69 83.75 15.95 0.89 0.00 3.40 0.00 28.05 28.00
Maximum 116.00 847586.00 29.88 892.81 87.80 23.80 1.82 4.00 4.47 2.00 32.10 35.50
Minimum 54.00 486961.00 24.32 591.46 77.20 10.60 0.40 0.00 0.69 0.00 23.70 22.50
Std. Dev. 15.15 87463.03 1.24 67.76 2.09 2.56 0.37 1.17 0.93 0.46 1.80 2.65
Skewness -0.28 -0.20 0.61 0.71 -0.39 0.44 0.55 1.17 -0.61 2.78 -0.23 0.41
Observations 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00
A-2: These are descriptive statisltics for the regression where POINTS is the dependent variable after the 2004-05 NHL Lockout
POINTS ATTENDANCE AVGAGE AVGAGESQ PENALTYKILL POWERPLAY RELSALARY TOPPAID LNYEARS STANLEYCUP SHOTS SHOTSAGAINST
Mean 91.27 700050.60 26.88 723.18 82.42 17.59 1.00 0.84 3.34 0.17 29.71 29.71
Median 93.00 691779.00 26.77 716.37 82.35 17.85 1.02 1.00 3.50 0.00 29.50 29.65
Maximum 124.00 872194.00 29.29 857.90 87.40 22.80 1.38 3.00 4.50 1.00 34.30 35.10
Minimum 56.00 513345.00 25.00 625.00 77.90 11.80 0.55 0.00 1.61 0.00 26.70 24.60
Std. Dev. 14.47 88145.43 0.96 52.14 2.47 2.52 0.16 0.75 0.77 0.37 1.89 2.25
Skewness -0.36 -0.14 0.42 0.50 -0.10 -0.13 -0.33 0.58 -0.32 1.79 0.51 -0.01
Observations 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00
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A-3: These are descriptive statistics for the regression where REVENUES is the dependent variable before the 2004-05 NHL 
Lockout
REVENUES ATTENDANCE AVGTICPRICE CANADIAN PROSPORTS TOPPAID YEARS POINTS GOALFOR
Mean 71.21 681956.60 42.12 0.20 1.90 0.83 33.86 86.69 214.33
Median 66.00 684981.00 41.70 0.00 2.00 0.00 30.00 91.00 213.00
M aximum 118.00 847586.00 57.11 1.00 5.00 4.00 87.00 116.00 269.00
M inimum 42.00 486961.00 27.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 54.00 164.00
Std. Dev. 19.68 87463.03 7.81 0.40 1.31 1.17 25.69 15.15 24.81
Skew ness 0.76 -0.20 0.16 1.50 0.19 1.17 0.89 -0.28 0.19
O bservations 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00
A-4: These are descriptive statistics for the regression where REVENUES is the dependent variable after the 2004-05 NHL Lockout
REVENUES ATTENDANCE AVGTICPRICE CANADIAN PROSPORTS TOPPAID YEARS POINTS GOALFOR
Mean 82.78 700050.60 44.35 0.20 1.90 0.84 36.74 91.27 235.73
Median 77.50 691779.00 43.68 0.00 2.00 1.00 33.00 93.00 236.50
M aximum 160.00 872194.00 88.32 1.00 5.00 3.00 90.00 124.00 312.00
M inimum 56.00 513345.00 25.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 56.00 189.00
Std. Dev. 19.66 88145.43 10.70 0.40 1.31 0.75 25.59 14.47 26.50
Skew ness 1-52 -0.14 0.94 1.50 0.19 0.58 0.90 -0.36 0.44
O bservations 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00
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A-9: This graph demonstrates why the independent variable AVGAGESQ was included in the regression. It represents that there is
diminishing skills as age increases.
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A-10: This graph demonstrates why the independent variable LNYEARS was included in the regression. It represents that the more
years a team has been in a city the more they will make in revenues until a certain point where the graph will level off.
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X. Glossary of Terms
National Hockey League Players Association (NHLPA) -  is the labor union for the 
professional hockey players in the National Hockey League 
National Hockey League (NHL) -  a professional men's ice hockey league started on 
November 22, 1917 that currently contains 30 teams in the U.S. and Canada.
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) -  A written agreement or contract that is the 
result of negotiations between an employer and a union. It sets out the conditions of 
employment (wages, hours, benefits, etc.) and ways to settle disputes arising during 
the term of the contract
Salary Cap -  the maximum amount of money that can be spent on salaries for a sports 
team
Revenue Sharing -  The sharing of overall team revenues amongst the other teams in the 
National Hockey League. Those teams that are eligible for the revenue sharing are, (1) are 
ranked in the bottom half (bottom 15) in League revenues, and (2) operate in markets 
with a Demographic Market Area of 2.5 million or fewer TV households.
Econometrics -  the application of mathematics and statistics to the study of economic 
and financial data
Points -  The method by which teams are ranked in the National Hockey League, the 
combination of wins -2 points, ties (before 2004) -  1 point, overtime loss - 1 point, and 
shootout loss -1  point
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Lockout -  is like a strike, with the employer stopping its employees from working, to 
put pressure on the labor union.
Penalty Kill -  The situation your team is in when someone from your team has committed a 
penalty and has to sit in the penalty box. Your team will have one less player on the ice than 
the other team so your team is at a disadvantage.
Power Play -The situation your team is in when the opposing team has committed a penalty 
and has to sit in the penalty box. Your team will have one more player on the ice than the 
other team so your team is at an advantage.
Plus/Minus -  The goal differential for a specific player while they are on the ice. If a goal is 
scored while they are on the ice by their team they would be a +1. If a goal is scored while they 
are on the ice by the other team they would be a -1. The plus/minus is not affected for when 
either team is on the power play.
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